The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures: Compromises and Controversies by Rubin, Ronald B.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 28 Issue 3 Article 7 
1979 
The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures: 
Compromises and Controversies 
Ronald B. Rubin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Ronald B. Rubin, The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures: Compromises and 
Controversies, 28 Cath. U. L. Rev. 605 (1979). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss3/7 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
THE UNIFORM GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYEE
SELECTION PROCEDURES:
COMPROMISES AND
CONTROVERSIES
Employment discrimination has worked severe economic hardships on
minorities, locking groups into cycles of poverty and making social ad-
vancement all the more difficult.I A major source of frustration for minor-
ities has been the extensive use by both public and private employers of
standardized, competitive employment tests. 2 Proponents of standardized
testing consider it an expedient measurement tool, enabling employers to
process large numbers of applicants in a relatively short period of time.3
As a class, however, minorities tend to score significantly lower on stan-
dardized employment tests than nonminorities, resulting in lower selection
rates for minority group members.4 Criticism has been leveled at these os-
tensibly neutral selection devices on the ground that patterned social and
economic inequalities prevent minorities from entering the employment
1. See generally G. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); A.
BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW (1971). See also H. HILL, BLACK LABOR
AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM I: RACE, WORK AND THE LAW (1977).
2. For the purposes of this note, the term "employment test" will mean any standard-
ized assessment instruments or procedures used for making inferences about the characteris-
tics of people which form the basis of an employment decision. See AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTS 2 (rev. ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 APA STANDARDS].
Almost every public employer uses a competitive, written examination as the basis for
making personnel decisions. Seegenerally 0. GLENN STAHL, PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINIS-
TRATION 128-48 (7th ed. 1976). From 1940 to 1965 some 3,000 new tests were developed. In
1963, 84% of American companies were reported to be using tests for personnel selection, as
compared with 64% in 1958. 3 A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: RACE § 75.21
(1977).
3. See, e.g., Bernhardt, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: The Implications for Private and
Public Employers, 50 TEX. L. REV. 901, 906 (1972).
4. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971) (passing rate for
whites, 58%; for blacks, 6%); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n,
482 F.2d 1333, 1335 (2d Cir. 1973) (passing rate for whites, 58%; for blacks and Puerto
Ricans, 17%); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 735 (1st Cir. 1972) (passing rate for whites,
65%; for blacks, 25%). Traditionally, blacks have suffered the most from unemployment,
have been relegated to the lowest paying and least rewarding jobs, and have been most
vulnerable to attrition due to technological advancements. See Edwards, Race Discrimina-
tion in Employment- What Price Equality?, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 572, 573-79; Hill, The New
Judicial Perception of Employment Discrimination - Litigation under the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 43 U. COLO. L. REV. 243, 244-50 (1972).
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selection process with resources equivalent to those of the wealthier, more
educated groups.5
Historically, standardized testing aided employers in avoiding charges
of discriminatory hiring practices by shrouding employment decisions with
a veil of objectivity.6 Largely because the traditionally accepted definition
of employment discrimination required proof of an invidious motive,
7
state fair employment laws were generally ineffective in protecting minori-
ties against arbitrary exclusion from employment opportunities. 8 Since
proof of discrimination turned on subtle and often elusive questions of
fact, state fair employment agencies attempted to achieve voluntary com-
pliance with state laws rather than institute troublesome administrative or
judicial proceedings.9
After extended debate and intensive lobbying by innumerable special
interest groups, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
196410 to serve as a comprehensive federal weapon for eliminating all as-
5. In Hobson v. Hanson, 269 F. Supp. 401, 481-85 (D.D.C. 1967), a f'd sub nom.
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), Circuit Judge Skelly Wright enumerated
several factors underlying the poor performance of minority children on standardized tests:
(1) environmental disadvantages, specifically those relating to the development of verbal
skills; (2) lack of self confidence in competing with persons from different cultural back-
grounds; (3) psychological turmoil relating to one's status as a minority; and (4) apathy due
to the atmosphere of low expectations fostered in urban schools. These same factors hamper
the performance of adult minorities on standardized tests. See notes 185-90 and accompa-
nying text infra. It is generally agreed, moreover, that poor minority performance is not
related to genetically determined abilities. See Note, Legal Implications of the Use of Stan-
dardizedAbility Tests in Employment and Education, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 691, 692-95 (1968).
6. See Comment, Developments in the Law- Employment Discrimination and Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1120-21 (1971).
7. Fair employment laws prohibit employer conduct falling within any of the classifi-
cations enumerated in the statute. See, e.g., note 10 infra. Before the Supreme Court's "re-
definition" of employment discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
a plaintiff usually had to demonstrate that the employer's conduct - e.g., its decision not to
hire - was motivated by an enumerated classification such as race. See Blumrosen, Stran-
gers in Paradise.- Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,
71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 66-74 (1972); Bonfield, The Substance of American Fair Employment
Practices Legislation . Employers, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 907, 955-57 (1967).
8. See Bonfield, An Institutional Analysis of the Agencies Administering Fair Employ-
ment Practices Law, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 823 (1967); Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employ-
ment Practices Commissions.- A Critical Analsis with Recommendations, 14 BUFFALO L.
REV. 22 (1965). See also P. NORGREN & S. HILL, TOWARD FAIR EMPLOYMENT (1964).
9. See Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 68; M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 41-44 (1966).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 15 (1970), as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 17 (1976). The Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
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pects of employment discrimination." Although this direct federal in-
volvement spawned significant legal challenges to employment decisions
predicated upon the use of test scores that excluded large numbers of mi-
norities,' 2 the resulting legal dilemma became readily apparent. While the
Act explictly condemned employment discrimination, it also expressly au-
thorized employers to use standardized tests as a basis for making employ-
ment decisions, so long as the results were not "intended or used to
discriminate."' 3 Yet, because large numbers of minority applicants con-
tinued to be denied employment by ostensibly neutral tests, the need to
identify discriminatory testing practices became paramount.
In 1966 the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)' 4
published its first set of testing guidelines,' 5 embodying EEOC's interpre-
ployment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;
or to. . .deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). For discussions of the controversies surrounding the Act's
passage, see Berg, Equal Employment Opportunity under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31
BROOKLYN L. REV. 62 (1964); Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COMM.
L. REV. 431 (1966). See also Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of
Private Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 225 (1976).
I1. S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [19641 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2355. See, e.g., Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals, 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970)
(Title VII provides a clear mandate from Congress that employment discrimination will not
be tolerated); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314, 321 (E.D. La. 1970) (legis-
lative purpose of Title VII is elimination of unjustified impediments to equal opportunity for
minorities).
12. See generally Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing under Fair Employment Laws.
A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598
(1969). By the late 1960's, 15% to 20% of all complaints filed under Title VII included a
charge that the use of standardized tests was discriminatory. 1d. at 1637.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). To foster a policy of color-blind employee selection
the Act provided that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlaw-
ful employment practice for an employer. . . to give and to act upon the results of
any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration
or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because
of race, color, religion or national origin.
Id.
14. The EEOC was created to investigate and attempt to conciliate claims of employ-
ment discrimination. The power to sue in federal district court, however, was originally
given to the Attorney General or the complainant. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-5 (1970).
Moreover, an attempt to give EEOC the power to issue cease and desist orders was stricken
in an early compromise bill. See Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 94-97. See also Comment,
Continuing Violations in Private Suits Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 32 ARK.
L. REV. 381 (1978).
15. Guidelines On Employment Testing Procedures, August 24, 1966, reprinted in
119671 2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH) $ 16,904.
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tation of Title VII as permitting only job-related tests.16 An employer was
in violation of the guidelines if it could not demonstrate that its employ-
ment tests, when shown to exclude a disproportionate number of minori-
ties, were job-related.' 7 Amended and reissued in 1970,18 EEOC's
guidelines incorporated a concept that was to become the focus of employ-
ment testing litigation: test validity.' 9
With the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
(EEOA), 20 federal, state and local governments, originally exempted from
Title VII's provisions, were brought within its reach.2' The 1972 Act also
16. EEOC's testing guidelines were promulgated pursuant to its power to issue procedu-
ral rules. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1976). EEOC was not granted the power to engage in
substantive rulemaking, nor were the guidelines federal regulations within the meaning of
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). See Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 95
n.143, 96. See also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-43 (1976).
17. The necessity of demonstrating a test's job-relatedness became a legal requirement
under Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 410 U.S. 424 (1971), in which the Court paid
"great deference" to EEOC's guidelines. Id. at 434. The Court stated that:
The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited . . . . More than that, Congress has placed on the employer the bur-
den of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to
the employment in question.
Id. at 431-32.
18. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1 to 1607.14 (1977). EEOC's 1970 guidelines
were similiar to those adopted by the Department of Labor, Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs. See Employee Testing and Other Selection Procedures, 41 C.F.R.
§§ 60-3.1 to 60-3.18 (1976). Although the 1964 Act exempted federal, state and local govern-
ments from Title VII, the Secretary of Labor was designated under Exec. Order No. 11,246,
3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 compilation), as amendedby Exec. Order No. 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 684
(1966-1970 compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 1236 (1976), to ensure that
equal employment opportunities were provided by employers awarded federal contracts.
See generally Comment, Executive Order No. 11,246: Presidential Power to Regulate Em-
ployment Discrimination, 43 Mo. L. REV. 451 (1978). The Civil Service Commission was
designated under Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970 compilation) amending
Exec. Order No. 11,246, as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,590, 3 C.F.R. 558 (1971-1975
compilation), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e app. at 1236 (1976), to implement equal em-
ployment opportunity for the federal government as a civilian employer and issued its own
set of guidelines. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 300.101 to 300.104 (1976).
19. Test validity is a psychological concept which indicates the degree to which a test
measures what it purports to measure and whether that which is measured is significant in
terms of job performance. See 1974 APA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 25-26; notes 32-43
and accompanying text infra. See generally L. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTING (3d ed. 1970).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-I to 2000e-17 (1976). See generally Sape & Hart, Title VII Re-
considered- The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 824
(1972); Note, Title VII and Public Employers.- Did Congress Exceed Its Powers?, 78 COLUM.
L. REV. 372 (1978).
21. The 1972 Act expanded Title VII's coverage to all employers engaged in industries
affecting commerce employing at least 15 workers, including any governmental industries,
[Vol. 28:605
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created the Equal Employment Opportunity Coordinating Council, com-
posed of the federal agencies with major equal employment enforcement
responsibilities, charged with the task of establishing a uniform set of test-
ing standards and avoiding inconsistent enforcement of federal equal em-
ployment opportunity law.22 Despite numerous attempts, however, the
member agencies were unable to agree on a uniform set of guidelines and
the EEOC finally withdrew from participation. 23 In November 1976, the
Civil Service Commission and the Departments of Justice and Labor re-
scinded their individual guidelines and adopted the Federal Executive
Agency (FEA) Guidelines 24 to interpret the Title VII mandate. While
most private employers were bound by the EEOC Guidelines, the FEA
Guidelines governed federal contractors subject to Executive Order No.
11,246,25 the federal government as a civilian employer, certain state and
local governments,26 and the Department of Justice in its prosecutorial re-
sponsibilities under federal law. 27
Following the enactment and subsequent amendment of Title VII, the
multiplicity of employee selection guidelines created administrative and
practical problems. 28 Conflicting standards, debate over the proper role of
businesses or activities. The federal government, corporations wholly owned by it, Indian
tribes, some departments and agencies of the District of Columbia, and certain private mem-
bership clubs are excluded from the definition of employers 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(b) (1976).
The Civil Service Commission, however, was specifically designated to enforce Title VII
against the federal government whenever it acts as a civilian employer. Id. § 2000e-16.
Enforcement power over states and localities was given to the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1976). See S. REP. No. 681, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1972).
Represented on the Council were the Departments of Labor and Justice, the Civil Service
Commission, the EEOC and the Civil Rights Commission. The various sets of major pre-
1972 Act guidelines are referenced at note 18 supra.
23. See 41 Fed. Reg. 51,734 (1976). See generally Seelman, Employment Testing Law.-
The Federal Agencies Go Public with the Problems, 10 URB. LAW. 1, 6-9 (1978).
24. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,734, 51,735 (Department of Justice), 51,744 (Department of Labor),
51,752 (Civil Service Commission) (1976). The EEOC republished its 1970 guidelines the
next day. 41 Fed. Reg. 51,984 (1976). The FEA Guidelines were based largely on the Coun-
cil's final draft of proposed guidelines. See 41 Fed. Reg. 29,016 (1976). For the purposes of
this note, citation to sections of the FEA Guidelines will be to the Department of Labor
compilation at 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-3.1 to 60-3.14 (1977).
25. See note 18 supra.
26. The Civil Service Commission was given additional equal employment responsibil-
ity under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4701 to 4772 (1976).
27. For a precise breakdown of the applicability of the FEA Guidelines to the Depart-
ment of Justice, see Note, Employment Testing and the Federal Executive Agency Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures- One Step Forward and Two Steps Backwardfor Equal
Employment Opportunity, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 852, 857 nn.32-33 (1977).
28. See generally Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A
Critical Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J.
1 (1977).
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the EEOC, and varying agency and court interpretations regarding the
scope of Title VII contributed to exacerbate the difficulties inherent in en-
forcing fair employment law.2 9 In a final effort to settle their differences
and attain uniform standards, the Civil Service Commission, the Depart-
ments of Justice and Labor, and the EEOC formally adopted the Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures on August 25, 1978.30 Be-
cause the Uniform Guidelines replace all prior federal employment testing
pronouncements, they shall have substantial ramifications for existing fair
employment law and the practice of employment testing. This note will
measure these guidelines against previous agency efforts to establish test-
ing standards and assess the degree to which they have accommodated the
underlying philosophical conflict between meritocracy and equal achieve-
ment.
3
'
I. TESTING, GUIDELINES AND THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
In the context of employment testing, a "valid" test is one that measures
an applicant against those elements of the job necessary for successful job
performance. Validity assessment can be viewed conceptually as a two-
step process: 32 first, indicators of job success are isolated through a job
analysis and weighted according to their relative importance;33 second, the
29. See, e.g., United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1109-16 (D.S.C. 1977),
afdmem. sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026 (1978); Peck, The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Developments in the Administrative Process
1965-1975, 51 WASH. L. REV. 831 (1976); Goldman, The Next Ten Years: Title VII Con-
fronts the Constitution, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 308 (1976). See also Gardner, The Development
of the Substantive Principles of Title VII Law: The Defendant's View, 26 ALA. L. REV. 1, 7
(1973), in which the author criticizes the courts for treating EEOC as an impartial agency
and for allowing plaintiffs to cite EEOC positions as if they were objective determinations.
30. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,295 (1978). The Uniform Guidelines will be reprinted in the Code
of Federal Regulations by each adopting agency. For the purposes of this note parallel
citation will be to EEOC's forthcoming compilation in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1 to 1607.16
(1979).
31. Meritocracy, an equal treatment concept, focuses upon the elimination of race as a
factor in making personnel decisions. Each individual is evaluated solely upon his or her
own presently demonstrable abilities. An equal achievement or equal results philosophy is
founded upon equitable and remedial principles, and emphasizes the need to distribute jobs
affirmatively and proportionately among society's various groups. See generally Fiss, .4 The-
ory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1971); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an
Unequal World- Equality for the Negro - the Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L.
REV. 363 (1966); Winter, Improving the Economic Status of Negroes through Laws Against
Discrimination: A Reply to Professor Sovern, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 817 (1967). See also Cala-
bresi, Bakke as Pseudo-Tragedy, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 427 (1979).
32. This simplification of validity assessment is presented only for purposes of illustra-
tion. For a complete discussion, see authorities cited in notes 33-34 infra.
33. A job analysis permits the specification of critical employee requirements for a par-
[Vol. 28:605
Uniform Guidelines
test itself is evaluated to determine whether it actually measures these in-
dicators, as well as its effectiveness in doing so. 34 The American Psycho-
logical Association (APA) has identified three acceptable methods for
determining test validity: criterion-related, content, and construct valida-
tion.35
A. Methods Of Test Validation
Criterion-related validity is investigated by comparing test scores with
external variables (criteria) believed to be direct measures of the job per-
formance in question.36 To determine whether validity exists under this
method, the relationship between test success and measures of actual job
performance is evaluated for statistical and practical significance. 37 Al-
though predicated upon statistical evaluation, and therefore considered to
be an empirical methodology, the ultimate merit of a criterion-related va-
lidity study depends upon the appropriateness and quality of the criteria
ticular job. These requirements vary in complexity with the position in question. For a
secretary, accurate and speedy typing may be necessary. For a systems analyst, abstract
reasoning ability may be important. For a machinist, overall manual dexterity and an un-
derstanding of basic geometry may be paramount. See E. GHISELLI, VALIDITY OF OCCUPA-
TIONAL APTITUDE TESTS 22-23 (1966); E. MCCORMICK & J. TIFFIN, INDUSTRIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 47-63 (6th ed. 1974).
34. See generally, A. ANASTASI, PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTING 134 (4th ed. 1976); STAHL,
supra note 2, at 131-32. Validity itself is not measured, rather, it is inferred from the data
collected during the test's evaluation. 1974 APA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 25.
35. 1974 APA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 26. All three methods are interrelated logi-
cally and operationally. A complete study will include information about all types of valid-
ity and only rarely will a single method be of overwhelming importance by itself. Id. See
generally ANASTASI, supra note 34, at 159.
36. Criterion-related validity indicates a test's effectiveness in predicting a person's be-
havior in a particular situation. ANASTASI, supra note 34, at 140. Examples of simple crite-
ria include supervisory ratings, number of units sold or produced, number of mistakes and
regularity of attendance. Criteria, however, are dynamic in nature and will vary over time.
See id. at 142-46; MCCORMICK & TIFFIN, supra note 33, at 35-36.
There are two types of criterion-related validity: predictive and concurrent. Predictive
validity indicates the extent to which an individual's future level of job performance can be
predicted from a prior test score (i.e., how good a mechanic will John be in six months?).
Concurrent validity shows the extent to which an applicant's present score will be predictive
of job success as measured against those already employed (i.e., how good a mechanic
would John be if he started now?). See 1974 APA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 26.
37. The relationship between test scores and the criteria must be significant both statisti-
cally and practically in order to infer that a test is valid. Statistical significance is a mathe-
matical demonstration of the test's accuracy in predicting successful job performance.
Practical significance would indicate that, under the circumstances of the test's use, the cor-
relation was of a statistically sufficient magnitude to be important as a measuring device.
See Wilson, 4 Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Company. Ruminations on Job Testing,
Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal Courts, 58 U. VA. L. REV. 844, 860-61 (1972).
19791
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measures chosen.38
The content and construct methods comprise what are sometimes char-
acterized as "rational" methods of validation because their efficacy de-
pends largely upon the judgments of psychologists analyzing the
relationship between the requisite job characteristics and the content of the
test itself.39 Content validation evaluates the correlation between test
questions or requirements and the skills or knowledge designed to be mea-
sured.4° Evaluating the validity of a particular test through an analysis of
its content is appropriate only for tests designed to measure an individual's
present skills or knowledge. 4' Construct validation, on the other hand, at-
tempts to determine the degree to which a test accurately measures
whether an individual possesses some hypothetical trait identified as neces-
sary for successful job performance. 42 Validity demonstrated in this man-
ner rests on the assumption that the presence of the construct in the
individual, as evidenced by his test score, is predictive of future job per-
formance.43
B. The EEOC Guidelines
Whenever a test disqualified a disproportionate number of minorities,
the EEOC's interpretive guidelines" mandated that it be job-related. 45
38. The theory behind criterion-related validity assumes that the criteria selected will
themselves possess validity. The isolation and evaluation of predictive criteria is difficult.
See 1974 APA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 27; GHISELu, supra note 33, at 22-23.
39. See E. GHISELLI, THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL MEASUREMENT 341-51 (1964); Note,
Application of the EEOC Guidelines to Employment Test Validation. A Uniform Standardfor
Both Public and Private Employers, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 505, 518 (1973).
40. ANASTASI, supra note 34, at 134-35.' For example, a test which measures one's abil-
ity to type would generally be considered content valid if the position tested for was that of a
secretary. Employment tests cannot be justified solely on the basis of content validity, how-
ever, unless the skills or behaviors tested for represent nearly all of the important elements
of the job. 1974 APA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 28-29.
41. A content valid test can tell an employer only whether or not a particular applicant
presently possesses certain skills or knowledge. It is not predictive in the sense that it would
indicate a person's level of performance at some "future" time. See Wilson, supra note 37,
at 863; 1974 APA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 28.
42. 1974 APA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 29-30. Examples of constructs include loy-
alty, perseverence, intelligence and mechanical comprehension.
43. See ANASTASI, supra note 34, at 151-58; Wilson, supra note 37, at 863-64.
44. Since the FEA and Uniform Guidelines did not become effective until 1976 and
1978 respectively, employment testing law developed primarily from court interpretations of
the EEOC Guidelines. In order to examine employment testing law from a developmental
perspective, the EEOC Guidelines will be discussed first.
45. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1977). Although the Guidelines themselves do not specify any
particular disqualification ratio as "disproportionate," the cases finding adverse impact gen-
erally report vast differences between the success rates for whites as compared with those for
[Vol. 28:605
Uniform Guidelines
The guidelines required that a test's validity be demonstrated by empirical
evidence, generated whenever possible by the use of criterion-related vali-
dation methods.46 The use of content or construct methods of validation
was restricted to those instances in which a criterion-related validity study
technically would not be feasible. 47 Yet, even if an employer had satisfied
this burden, the guidelines additionally required that the employer show a
lack of "suitable alternatives" with less adverse impact on minorities.48
This requirement not only placed a heavy evidentiary burden on the em-
ployer, but was further complicated by the vagueness of the term "suita-
ble."'49 By placing the burden of proving the nonexistence of suitable
alternatives on the employer, the EEOC guidelines opened the door to
endless debate over the comparative discriminatory effect of a wide variety
of tests.50 Moreover, because the cost of validating only one test is so sub-
stantial, few employers could afford to investigate and validate numerous
alternative selection devices.5 '
Perhaps the most stringent requirement of the EEOC guidelines was
that tests should be analyzed for differential validity.52 This concept was
based on the theory that a test may be a valid predictor of job success for
one group - usually mainstream whites, but not for others - usually
blacks due to the continuing effects of past segregation and cultural separa-
tism. 53 Differential validity would not exist, however, merely because one
group continually scores lower than another. Rather, a test is considered
minorities. See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1372 (5th Cir.
1974) (failure rate for whites, 15%; failure rate for blacks, 49%).
46. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(a) (1977).
47. Technical feasibility was defined as "having or obtaining" sufficient numbers of mi-
norities to achieve findings of statistical and practical significance. The employer was as-
signed the burden of proving the absence of technical feasibility by "positive evidence." Id.
§ 1607.4(b).
48. Id. § 1607.3. The EEOC also required an employer to demonstrate that its test
evidenced a "high degree of utility" or practical usefulness. The APA has never established
standards for measuring a test's utility. See Seelman, supra note 23, at 12-17; Comment,
supra note 6, at 1128.
49. See Johnson, Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody" The Aftermath of Griggs and the
Death oEmployee Testing, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1239, 1260 (1976).
50. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). "[T]here must
be available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish
the business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial
impact." Id. at 798, quoted with approval in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494
F.2d 211, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1974).
51. See Gardner, supra note 29, at 72-73; Comment, supra note 6, at 1130.
52. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4(a), 1607.5(b)(5) (1977).
53. An often cited text in this area concludes that "evidence of test validity or invalidity
in a given ethnic group cannot be safely assumed to apply to another ethnic group." J.
KIRKPATRICK, R. EWEN, R. BARRETT & R. KATZELL, TESTING AND FAIR EMPLOYMENT:
1979]
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differentially valid when it operates to over predict or under predict the job
success of a particular group. 54 As a part of the overall validation study,
the EEOC guidelines required an employer to generate and report test
data for each minority group involved and then to validate the test for
each group separately, whenever feasible.55 If differential validity was in-
dicated, an employer was prohibited from using that test on groups for
which the test was believed to be nonpredictive. 56
C. Judicial Response to the EEOC Guidelines
Prior to the enactment of Title VII, adverse impact was not generally
considered to be prima facie evidence of employment discrimination ab-
sent an invidious motive on the part of an employer.57 After the Act's
passage, however, federal district courts began enjoining the use of tests
when a plaintiff proved that a particular test's use had deprived his group
or class of employment opportunities and was not job-related. 58 In Griggs
v. Duke Power Company, 59 the Supreme Court enunciated two principles
critical to employment testing litigation. First, the Court defined employ-
ment discrimination under Title VII in terms of adverse effect rather than
discriminatory intent. Secondly, the Court interpreted Title VII's testing
provision to sanction only tests proven to be job-related, thereby affirming
that aspect of the EEOC guidelines. 60
Griggs was a class action brought by black employees of the Duke
Power Company, alleging that the requirements of a high school diploma
or passing scores on a standardized test as a prerequisite to initial employ-
ment or promotion was discriminatory under Title VII.61 In reversing the
FAIRNESS AND VALIDITY OF PERSONNEL TESTS FOR DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS 30 (1968).
But see note 152 and accompanying text infra.
54. See Wilson, supra note 37, at 869.
55. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4(a), 1607.5(b)(5) (1977). See note 47 supra.
56. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(b)(5) (1977).
57. See generally Seelman, supra note 23, at 47.
58. See, e.g., United States v. Local 86, Iron Workers, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash.
1970), af'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971)(Flanagan Aptitude Test); Hicks v. Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970)(Wonderlic, Bennett, SRA Non-Verbal);
Penn v. Stumpf, 308 F. Supp. 1238 (N.D. Cal. 1970)(civil service exam); Arrington v. Massa-
chusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass. 1969)(General Aptitude Battery).
But see United States v. H.K. Porter Co., 296 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ala. 1968) (use of General
Aptitude Battery and SRA Non-Verbal not enjoined due to insufficient evidence of discrimi-
natory effect).
59. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
60. Id. at 431-32. See Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 61-63.
61. 401 U.S. at 426-28. Both the district court, 292 F. Supp. 243 (M.D.N.C. 1968), and
the court of appeals, 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970), had rejected this argument in the absence
of proof of discriminatory intent.
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circuit court's ruling that a showing of intent was necessary to prove dis-
crimination under Title VII, the Supreme Court held that any employment
test which operated to disqualify a disproportionate number of minorities
was unlawful unless justified by "business necessity. ' '62 In rejecting Duke
Power's contention that, regardless of their impact, facially neutral tests
were expressly authorized by section 703(h) of the Act,6 3 the Court gave
"great deference" 64 to EEOC's interpretive guidelines permitting the use of
only job-related tests whenever their use had an adverse effect on minori-
ties.65 The Griggs Court, however, failed to explain the manner in which
job-relatedness was to be demonstrated and to prescribe the degree of rela-
tionship necessary to justify a test's continued use, once adverse impact
had been shown. 66 The Court's endorsement of EEOC's guidelines, there-
fore, was limited to EEOC's interpretation of section 703(h) as requiring
tests to be job-related whenever they had an adverse impact on minority
groups.
67
After Griggs, the great majority of federal employment testing cases
found tests adversely affecting minorities unlawful either because the test
had not been validated at all68 or because the courts viewed the attempted
validation as defective under the EEOC guidelines. In United States v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co.,69 for example, a district court found a promo-
tion test to be nondiscriminatory because it was designed by professional
railroad personnel and its relationship to job qualifications could be ra-
tionally inferred.70 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit rejected the district court's
finding, stating that the "safest validation method is that which conforms
with the EEOC guidelines expressing the will of Congress."'7 1 Similarly, in
United States v. Georgia Power Co. ,72 the Fifth Circuit determined that the
EEOC guidelines were the appropriate framework for establishing validity
62. 401 U.S. at 431. See note 17 supra.
63. See note 13 supra.
64. 401 U.S. at 434.
65. Id. at 433 n.9. Under Griggs, once the plaintiff demonstrates that the test adversely
affects minorities, the employer must show that its tests are job-related. Id. at 431-32. See
notes 160-78 and accompanying text infra.
66. The Griggs Court did not reach these questions presumably because the tests at
issue were adopted simply to "improve the overall quality of the workforce" and no attempt
had been made to validate them. See 401 U.S. at 428, 431.
67. See Johnson, supra note 49, at 1248. But see Bernhardt, supra note 3, at 901, 912.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 327 F. Supp. 1034, 1040 (E.D.
Va. 1971).
69. 316 F. Supp. 567 (M.D. Fla. 1970), modofed, 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
70. 316 F. Supp. at 583. See 451 F.2d at 455.
71. Id at 456 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 434).
72. 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally Comment, The Georgia Power Case:
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"absent a showing that some cogent reason exists for noncompliance. '73
Moreover, in Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co.7 4 the same court sub-
sequently mandated validation in accordance with the EEOC guidelines.
In its first opportunity to rule on the technical aspects of validation, the
Supreme Court, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,75 followed the lower
courts and required strict compliance with the EEOC guidelines. Al-
bemarle involved a class action by black employees seeking, in part, to
enjoin the use of two pre-employment general ability tests on the ground
that they were not job-related. 76 The Court initially reaffirmed its holding
in Griggs that Title VII prohibits the use of any employment test having an
adverse effect on minorities unless the employer could show that the test
has a "manifest relationship" to the employment in question. 77 Agreeing
with the circuit court,78 the majority then found Albemarle's attempt to
validate its tests insufficient in several respects. First, the employer had
failed to conduct an adequate job analysis in the development of perform-
ance criteria.79 Second, while the validation study focused on high-level
job groups, the results were used to validate tests for entry-level positions
without showing an absence of significant differences among job groups.80
Finally, Albemarle's study was criticized because it failed to validate dif-
ferentially the tests for minorities. 81
Another FederalAgency Comes ofAge, or "My God! Our Employer Client's Testing Practices
Are Being Challenged by the EEOC?!", 57 MARQ. L. REV. 515 (1974).
73. 474 F.2d at 913.
74. 494 F.2d 211, 221 (5th Cir. 1974). Both the Sixth and Eighth Circuits also endorsed
a strict compliance rule. See EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 317 (6th Cir.
1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977); Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510
F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
75. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
76. Id. at 408-11. The other major issue in the case involved the appropriate standards
for awarding back pay.
77. Id. at 425 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432).
78. 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
79. 422 U.S. at 431-33. Job performance criteria were determined by vague and subjec-
tive supervisory ratings. Id See EEOC, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.5(b)(3) & 1607.5(b)(4) (1977).
80. 422 U.S. at 431-32, 434. See EEOC, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)(2) (1977).
81. 422 U.S. at 435. See EEOC, 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4(a), 1607.5(b)(5) (1977). Judicial
precedent for requiring differential validation was initially established in United States v.
Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418, 456 (5th Cir. 1971). Subsequently, in United
States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973), although acknowledging the
possible unreliability of differential validity studies, the Fifth Circuit chose to mandate strict
compliance. Id. at 914. The Eighth Circuit in Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d
1340, 1350 (8th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), followed Georgia Power
in striking down validation efforts where differential validity studies had not been under-
taken. Although EEOC's requirement of differential validation had become accepted by the
courts, it had come under increasing attack by the psychological profession. See note 152
and accompanying text infra.
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In Albemarle, however, the Court apparently repudiated the EEOC's re-
quirement that the employer demonstrate the absence of less discrimina-
tory alternatives.82 It placed the burden of proving the existence of these
alternatives on the plaintiff, regarding them as "evidence that the employer
was using his test merely as a pretext for discrimination. ' 83 Despite this,
the Court's opinion was generally interpreted to mean that tests which
have not been validated according to the technical aspects of the EEOC
Guidelines would not be considered job-related within the meaning of
Griggs,84 and thus would be discriminatory under Title VII.85
Following Griggs, the trend towards strict compliance with the EEOC
Guidelines spread to non-Title VII cases. In Douglas v. Hampton,86 an
action brought under the fifth amendment 87 and section 16 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1870,88 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled that the federal governmnent's efforts to validate
the Federal Service Entrance Exam by the construct method were inade-
quate, partly because the government had not shown that criterion-related
validity studies were infeasible. In so holding, the court relied on the
Supreme Court's general approval of the EEOC Guidelines in Griggs and
the Fifth Circuit's decision in Georgia Power.89 The Second Circuit came
to a similar conclusion in Kirkland v. New York State Department of Cor-
rectional Services,9" another non-Title VII case. Relying on the Supreme
82. The Court stated the following: "[I]f an employer does then meet the burden of
proving that its tests are lob related,' it remains open to the complaining party to show that
other tests or selection devices, without a similar undesirable racial effect, would also serve
the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy workmanship.'" 422 U.S. at
425. See EEOC, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1977).
83. 422 U.S. at 425. Thus, the mere existence of alternatives would not necessarily lead
to the conclusion that an employer's use of a validated test which adversely affects minorities
is discriminatory. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-05 (1973).
84. See note 17 supra.
85. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 49, at 1256. In separate opinions both Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun criticized the majority for its apparent treatment of the EEOC
Guidelines as mandatory. See 422 U.S. at 449-53 (Burger, C.J., concurring and dissenting);
Id at 447-49 (Blackmun, J. concurring in the judgment).
86. 512 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Black college graduates, hired as temporary employ-
ees, sought to enjoin the Civil Service Commission from firing anyone who failed the Fed-
eral Service Entrance Examination.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. V, which provides that "[no person shall... be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
89. 512 F.2d at 986. Noting Congress' extension of Title VII to public employers in
1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-16 (1976), and the application of Title VII standards by
other courts to non-Title VII cases, the court applied EEOC's Guidelines even though the
case had been brought on equal protection grounds. 512 F.2d at 980-81.
90. 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976). Blacks and Hispanics
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Court's strong endorsement of the EEOC Guidelines in Albemarle,9 1 the
court adopted the EEOC's position of accepting content or construct valid-
ity only when criterion-related validity studies were not feasible.9 2 The
First and Fourth Circuits reached a similar result.
93
In Washington v. Davis,94 however, the Supreme Court refused to follow
the decisions of most lower courts to apply the EEOC Guidelines to non-
Title VII cases. Davis arose when black applicants for jobs as police of-
ficers in the District of Columbia were rejected because they failed a test
purporting to measure verbal and reading skills. The plaintiffs brought
suit under the fifth amendment" and section 16 of the Civil Rights Act of
1870,96 charging that the tests were unrelated to successful job perform-
ance and disqualified a disproportionate number of black applicants.
97
In reinstating the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Dis-
trict of Columbia,98 the Supreme Court first held that a plaintiff must show
discriminatory intent to carry its burden of proof when asserting a viola-
tion of the Constitution.99 On the statutory issue, the Court found the test
to be rationally related to a legitimate government objective: that police
sued under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (1976) to enjoin the use of a promotion exam for
state correctional officers in which a significantly higher percentage of whites received a
passing score.
91. See notes 75-85 and accompanying text supra.
92. 520 F.2d at 426. The decision in Kirk/and effectively overruled the policy position
adopted in Vulcan Soc'y, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973). In Vul-
can, a non-Title VII case, the court stated that "[Tihe Fourteenth Amendment no more
enacted a particular theory of psychological testing than it did Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statistics." Id. at 394.
93. See United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir.
1973) (relying on the fourteenth amendment); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-33 (Ist
Cir. 1972) (decided pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1976)). But see Tyler v. Vickery,
517 F.2d 1089, 1095-98 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976) (Title VII standards
not applicable to state bar exam; despite adverse effect on minorities, no violation of four-
teenth amendment because exam rationally related to legitimate state interest of determin-
ing lawyer competency). See generally Comment, Equal Protection And Standardized
Testing, 44 Miss. L.J. 900, 908-22 (1973). See also Note, Burden of Proof In Equal Protection
Discriminatory Impact Cases- An Emerging Standard, 26 CATH. U.L. REV. 815 (1977); Note,
Racially Disproportionate Impact of Facially Neutral Practices - What Approach Under 42
U.SC. Sections 1981 and 1982?, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1267.
94. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). At the time the suit was brought Title VII was not applicable
to the District of Columbia. Id. at 238 n.10.
95. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
97. See Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The court of ap-
peals applied Title VII standards.
98. See Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972).
99. 426 U.S. at 239, 242. See generally Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of
Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977).
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officers have a certain level of communicative skills.'00 Instead of paying
"great deference"'' to the EEOC Guidelines, the majority essentially ig-
nored the requirement that tests be predictive of actual job success.' 0 2 In
contrast, the Court viewed a positive correlation between test scores and
training school performance as sufficient to "validate" the exam and sus-
tain the legality of its administration. 0 3 In Davis, the majority not only
refused to extend Title VII standards to situations not directly covered by
the Act, but also evidenced a willingness to accept methods of demonstrat-
ing job-relatedness which did not meet the EEOC's strict empirical re-
quirements. 04 In light of the Griggs and Albemarle mandate that tests be
predictive or significantly correlated with actual job success,10 5 Davis' sub-
jective construction of "job-relatedness"' 0 6 materially altered prior inter-
pretations of the concept making the depth of the inquiry dependent upon
the legal basis of the claim.' 07
D. The FEA Guidelines
Although short-lived themselves, the issuance of the comparatively leni-
ent Federal Executive Agency (FEA) Guidelines in 1976108 had a major
impact upon the eventual development of uniform employment testing
standards. First, their adoption marked a fundamental change in the posi-
tion among the federal agencies with major equal employment opportu-
nity responsibilities. Whereas the Departments of Justice and Labor had
originally supported EEOC's demands for empirical stringency, the adop-
100. Id. at 250-51 & n.17.
101. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 433-34.
102. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1, 1607.3 (1977).
103. 426 U.S. at 250-51 & n.17.
104. Id. at 247 n.13. See United States v. South Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 1094, 1112-15
(D.S.C. 1977), aj7'dmem sub nom. National Educ. Ass'n v. South Carolina, 434 U.S. 1026
(1978); Portwood & Schmidt, Beyond Griggs v. Duke Power Company. Title VII after Wash-
ington V. Davis, 28 LAB. L.J. 174, 180 (1977).
105. See notes 17 and 75-85 and accompanying text supra.
106. See 426 U.S. at 250-51. The Davis majority neither analyzed the job skills in ques-
tion nor the standards by which they were measured. See id. at 266-67 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing).
107. According to the Davis majority, judicial inquiry into job-relatedness under Title
VII "involves a more probingjudicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reason-
able acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Constitution where
special racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed." Id. at 247. See Com-
ment, Washington v. Davis: Reassessing the Bars to Employment Discrimination, 43 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 747, 763-72 (1977) (Davis either diluted the requirement of job-relatedness for
all purposes or created a double standard).
108. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-3.1 to 60-3.14 (1977). See notes 24-27 and accompanying text
supra.
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tion of the FEA Guidelines indicated their acceptance of the Civil Service
Commission's flexible approach.'0 9 Secondly, the promulgation of the
FEA Guidelines created awkward situations under which certain employ-
ers were subject to two different sets of federal testing standards." 0 Both
these factors, combined with EEOC's inability to effectively manage its
caseload,"' fostered agency cooperation in the development of the Uni-
form Guidelines.
II. THE UNIFORM GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYEE SELECTION PROCEDURES
The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures supersede
both the EEOC and FEA guidelines." 2 As such, they constitute the offi-
cial policy statement of the federal government on employment testing.
While they depart significantly from the EEOC version, the Uniform
Guidelines retract some of the flexibility available to employers under the
FEA guidelines in terms of both test validation and operational use. In
addition, they clarify much of the ambiguity characterizing previous
guidelines, thereby providing more precise benchmarks for all test users.
A. Validation Strategies and Technical Standards
1. Criterion-Related Validation
Both the Uniform and FEA Guidelines incorporated the most current
test validation strategies recognized by the American Psychological Associ-
109. See Seelman, supra note 23, at 1-2, 10; note 18 supra.
110. For example, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976), EEOC has jurisdiction over state,
local and private employers. But since the Department of Labor has jurisdiction over gov-
ernment contractors under Executive Order No. 11,246, it presumably would be up to the
courts to decide which set of guidelines governed the conduct of an employer that fell within
the jurisdiction of both agencies. Another possible conflict arose where state police pro-
grams were funded by grants from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration under
the Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701 to 3796 (1976), which
gives the Department of Justice enforcement responsibility against states engaging in pat-
terns and practices of discrimination by way of discriminatory employment tests.
11. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 28, at 68-81.
112. The Uniform Guidelines were formally adopted by the following agencies: EEOC,
43 Fed. Reg. 38,312 (1978), for use under Title VII; the Department of Labor, 43 Fed. Reg.
38,314 (1978), for use under Exec. Order No. 11,246; the Department of Justice, 43 Fed. Reg.
38,311 (1978), for use in its prosecutorial responsibilities under federal law; the Civil Service
Commission, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,310 (1978), for use under Title VII and its responsibilities
under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4701 to 4772 (1976); and the De-
partment of the Treasury, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,309 (1978), in connection with its equal employ-
ment responsibilities under the State and Local Government Assistance Act of 1972, 31
U.S.C. §§ 1221 to 1264 (1976).
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ation.113 Unlike the EEOC Guidelines, which mandated criterion-related
validation unless the employer could demonstrate technical in-
feasibility, 14 both the Uniform and FEA Guidelines removed this burden
from the employer. Content and construct validation are permitted so
long as the employer complies with the guidelines' procedures." 15
In comparison to the EEOC's somewhat skeletal treatment of this
area, 116 the Uniform Guidelines provide employers with specific proce-
dures, thereby facilitating their compliance.' 1 7 The technical standards for
conducting criterion-related validity studies are essentially the same for
both the Uniform and FEA Guidelines" 18 and require the employer to
provide evidence of the test's utility" 9 as well as validity when there is
adverse impact. 120 More importantly, the Uniform Guidelines mandate
that both utility and validity evidence be furnished to support the use of
113. Uniform Guidelines, § 5(C), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,298 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.5(c)); FEA, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.5(b) (1977). See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
For its technical requirements the EEOC Guidelines were guided by standards promul-
gated by the APA in 1966, wherein a preference for criterion-related validation was ex-
pressed. Both the Uniform and FEA Guidelines relied on the 1974 APA Standards which,
rather than preferring one method over another, recognized all three methods so long as
feasible and appropriate. See generally Hunt, Civil Service Testing and Affirmative Action." .4
Psychologist's Perspective, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 690 (1975).
114. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.5(a), 1607.4(b) (1977). See notes 46-47 supra.
115. Uniform Guidelines, § 5(A), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,298 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.5(A)); FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.5(a) (1977). Significantly, the Uniform
Guidelines specifically state that an employer is not obligated to hire minorities for the pur-
pose of making criterion-related validity studies technically feasible. Uniform Guidelines, §
14(B)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,300 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(1)). This point
was left unclear by the language of the EEOC Guidelines. See note 47 supra.
116. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5 (1977).
117. The American Psychological Association has stated the following: "We are of the
opinion that the Technical Standards of the Guidelines continue development toward a pro-
fessionally sound approach to the use of the employment selection procedures. We com-
mend the drafters of these Guidelines for the important contribution that they have made."
American Psychological Association, Committee on Psychological Tests and Assessment,
Statement on the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (February 17,
1978).
118. Compare Uniform Guidelines, § 14(B), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,300-02 (1978)(to be codified
in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)) with FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.12(b) (1977). As with the
EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.(b)(5) (1977), both consider the correlation of 0.05 to be
a statistically significant relationship between performance on the test and the criteria meas-
ure. Uniform Guidelines, § 14(B)(5), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,301 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.14(B)(5)); FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.12(b)(5) (1977). See notes 36-37 supra.
119. The APA has never established standards for measuring "utility." However, exam-
ples of utility considerations might include lower costs, higher production and decreased
absenteeism. See note 48 supra. See generally L. CRONBACH & G. GLESER, PSYCHOLOGI-
CAL TESTS & PERSONNEL DECISIONS 3-4, 121-32 (2d ed. 1965).
120. Uniform Guidelines, § 14(B)(6), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,301 (1978)(to be codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(6)); FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.12(b)(5) (1977). See NAACP,
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scores for either ranking or cutoff purposes.121
2. Content Validation
Before content studies may be undertaken, the Uniform Guidelines re-
quire the employer to conduct a job analysis to determine important work
behaviors, assess their relative importance, and select for actual measure-
ment only those critical or important behaviors encompassing most of the
job's requirements.' 2 2 Under the Uniform Guidelines, an employer can
demonstrate content validity in one of two ways: it may show that the in-
strument's content is representative of, and in fact measures, work behav-
iors necessary for successful job performances, or it may show that the test
measures skills, knowledge or abilities used in and necessary for the per-
formance of important work behaviors.' 23 Before scores from a content
validated test can be used to rank applicants, the employer must show,
through a job analysis, that a higher score is likely to result in better job
performance and that the test in fact differentiates among levels of job
performance. 24 As with criterion-related validation, the Uniform Guide-
lines require an employer using content validated tests for either ranking
or cutoff purposes to provide evidence of utility. 25 By emphasizing the
critical importance of a well-reasoned job analysis, the Uniform Guide-
lines recognize that important job elements cannot be ascertained through
Ensley Branch v. Seibels, [1977] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)(14 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 676, 680-
83 (N.D. Ala., Jan. 10, 1977).
121. Interview with Prof. Alfred Blumrosen, Rutgers University, in Washington, D.C.
(October 18, 1978). See Uniform Guidelines, §§ 5(G) to 5(H), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,298 (1978) (to
be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.5(G)-I607.5(H)).
122. Section 14(C)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,302 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §
1607.14(C)(2)). Work behavior is defined as "an activity performed to achieve the objectives
of the job," be it mental or physical. While skills, knowledge or abilities may be used in
work behaviors, they are not work behaviors in themselves. Id. § 16(Y), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,308
(1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.16(Y)).
123. Section 14(C)(4), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,302 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §
1607.14(c)(4)). Under the Uniform Guidelines content validation is inappropriate for tests
designed to make inferences about mental processes (i.e. tests which purport to measure
judgment, personality or intelligence). Moreover, a test's use cannot be justified by evidence
of content validity if it measures skills, knowledge or, abilities that, are generally learned on
the job. Id. § 14(C)(1), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,302 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §
1607.14(C)(1)). See note 41 supra.
124. Uniform Guidelines, § 14(C)(9), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,303 (1978)(to be codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1607.14(C)(9)).
125. Id. §§ 5(G) to 5(H), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,298 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §§
1607.5(G) to 1607.5(H)). When a test adversely affects minorities, the guidelines indicate
that more evidence is required to support a decision to use scores for ranking than cutoff
purposes, but warn that the cutoff score must be set at a reasonable level. Id.
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a vague or subjective methodology. 26
When compared with the FEA approach to content validation, the Uni-
form Guidelines are more specific and precise. 127 Rather than demanding
that important work behaviors be isolated through a detailed job analysis,
the FEA Guidelines merely instructed the employer to ascertain a per-
formance domain 28 through either a job analysis, an examination of work
activities, or the combined judgment of persons familiar with the job. 129
The employer could then establish content validity upon showing that the
desirable skills, knowledge or abilities were both tested for and measured
by the instr'iment and that they were substantially the same as those
needed for successful job performance. 30 The FEA Guidelines permitted
ranking if higher scores leading to better job performance could "be ex-
pected," and if the performance domain included aspects differentiating
among levels of performance.13
3. Construct Validation
The Uniform Guidelines also impose stricter standards than the FEA
Guidelines for the use and validation of tests through construct validity
studies. 32 Although both sets of guidelines call for a job analysis to deter-
mine those constructs indicative of job performance, the Uniform Guide-
lines further require that each construct be separately named and
distinguished from the other constructs involved. 33 The FEA Guidelines
permitted the operational use of a construct validated test if some empiri-
cal evidence existed relating performance on the test to performance on the
job, preferably generated from a criterion-related validity study. 134 More
importantly, the Uniform Guidelines go a step further by requiring that
the test be related to the construct and that the construct be related to the
126. See note 33 supra. Aside from its value in preparing for validity studies, it has been
suggested that job analysis will enable employers to identify "high value" jobs into which
minorities can be placed for remedial purposes and aid in the defense of a discrimination
charge. Bates & Vail, Job Ealuation and Equal Emloyment Opportunity.- A Toolfor Compli-
ance - .4 Weaponfor Defense, I EMP. REL. L.J. 535 (1976).
127. The EEOC guidelines did not enumerate standards for content validation.
128. A performance domain could include general work activities and duties, as well as
important work behaviors and essential skills or knowledge. 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.13(c)(I)
(1977).
129. Id.
130. Id. § 60-3.12(c)(4).
131. Id. § 60-3.12(c)(2).
132. The EEOC guidelines did not enumerate standards for construct validation.
133. Uniform Guidelines, § 14(D)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,303 (1978)(to be codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1607.14(D)(2)); FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.12(d)(1) (1977).
134. 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.12(d)(3) (1977).
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performance of important work behaviors. 135
4. Transportability and Interim Use
The EEOC Guidelines placed a difficult burden on an employer at-
tempting to demonstrate the job-relatedness of a particular test by gener-
alizing from a prior validity study. In this situation, the employer was first
required to show that it was infeasible to validate its own tests. Addition-
ally, it was necessary to demonstrate job compatibility and the absence of
major contextual variables. 136 As a matter of policy, both the Uniform
and FEA Guidelines encourage all test users to cooperate in developing
validity evidence. 137 Nevertheless, the FEA Guidelines permitted an em-
ployer to use another test's validity study if the weight of the evidence
showed the procedures to be valid, and the jobs in question were, through
a job analysis, shown to be substantially the same.' 38 In contrast, the Uni-
form Guidelines permit generalization of validity evidence only if the
prior study has in fact complied with the technical aspects of the Uniform
Guidelines and a job analysis indicates that the major work behaviors at
issue are substantially the same. 139
All three sets of guidelines permit an employer to use, on an interim
basis, a test which presently is not validated completely, as long as the
employer can demonstrate substantial evidence of validity and complete
validation studies are in progress. 140 The Uniform and FEA Guidelines
recognize, however, that there may be circumstances under which none of
the enumerated validation techniques would apply. 14 In these situations,
135. Section 14(D)(3), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,303 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §
1607.14(D)(3)).
136. EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.7 (1977).
137. Uniform Guidelines, §§ 8(A), 7(A), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,299 (1978)(to be codified in 29
C.F.R. §§ 1607.8(A), 1607.17(A)); FEA Guidelines 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.6(a) (1977). This provi-
sion should allow employers to rely on validity evidence generated by test publishing com-
panies and research organizations.
138. 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.6(b) (1977).
139. Sections 7(A), 7(B)(1) to 7B(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,299 (1978)(to be codified in 29
C.F.R. §§ 1607.7(A), 1607.7(B)(1) to 1607.7(B)(2)). In addition, the Uniform guidelines spe-
cifically limit the transportability or generalization of construct validated tests based on less
than complete criterion studies to only those situations in which an employer can demon-
strate comparability of jobs, constructs and employees. Id. § 14(D)(4), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,303
(1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(D)(4)). For a complete discussion of the trans-
portability of validity evidence, see ANASTASI, supra note 34, at 149-5 i. Both the Uniform
and FEA guidelines call for fairness studies when using another's validity evidence. See
notes 149-59 and accompanying text infra.
140. EEOC Guidelines, § 1607.9 (1977); FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.5(h) (1977);
Uniform Guidelines, § 5(J), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,298-99 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §
1607.5(J)). See, e.g., Friend v. Leidinger, 446 F. Supp. 361. 370 (E.D. Va.) (1977).
141. Uniform Guidelines, § 6(B), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,299 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
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employers are advised to use procedures that are as job-related as possible,
either undertaking modification so as to eliminate any adverse impact or
otherwise justifying their continued use.' 42
B. Investigation of Alternatives
In contrast to the EEOC's requirement, neither the FEA nor the Uni-
form Guidelines obligate the employer to prove the nonexistence of suita-
ble alternatives, when its test adversely affects minority employment
opportunities.143 The investigation of alternatives, however, continues to
play a significant role in justifying the use of a test having adverse im-
pact.144 The FEA Guidelines indicated than when a validity study became
necessary, the employer should make reasonable efforts to investigate for
alternative tests with less adverse impact. 145 Under the Uniform Guide-
lines, however, the search for alternative tests, appropriate methods of ad-
ministration and score use have been mandated as part of the original
validity study.' 46 The importance of this extension is highlighted by the
decision in Allen v. City of Mobile,147 the first case to apply the Uniform
Guidelines. In Allen, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama found a content validation effort legally insufficient
because the employer did not investigate the required alternatives as part
of the validity study.' 48
C. A Testfor "Fairness" Replaces Diferential Validity
The concept of differential validity is highly controversial in employ-
ment testing.' 49 The EEOC Guidelines required employers to undertake
§ 1607.6(B)); FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.3(b) (1977). Cf Smith v. Olin Chemical
Corp., 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977) (requirement of healthy back for manual laborer so
manifestly job-related that even if it has discriminatory effect, employer not obligated to
prove its necessity).
142. Uniform Guidelines, §§ 6(B)(1) to 6B(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,299 (1978)(to be codified
in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.6(B)(1) to 1607.6(B)(2)); FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-3.3(b)(1) to
60-3.3(b)(2) (1977).
143. See EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1977); notes 48-51 & 82-83 and accom-
panying text supra.
144. See Uniform Guidelines, Supplementary Information, Part II, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,291-
92 (1978), citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). See also McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
145. 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.3(c) (1977).
146. Sections 3(B), 5(G) to 5(H), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,297-98 (1978)(to be codified at 29
C.F.R. §§ 1607.3(B), 1607.5(A) to 1607.5(H)). The employer is not, however, under a duty
to continually search for alternatives. Id.
147. [1978] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA)(18 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 217 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 9, 1978).
148. Id. at 222-23.
149. See MCCORMICK & TIFFIN, supra note 33, at 131-34; Schmidt, Berner & Hunter,
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differential validity investigations as part of any validation effort. 150 The
employer's failure to conduct such studies was cited by several courts as
one reason for finding a test's use unlawful. 5 1 Standards for measuring
differential validity, however, have never been established by the Ameri-
can Psychological Association. Moreover, studies completed after the pub-
lication of the EEOC Guidelines criticized both the statistical accuracy of
earlier studies purporting to find differential validity and the general the-
ory itself.' 52
Under the Uniform Guidelines, differential validity studies are no
longer a prerequisite to lawful test use. Standardized tests, however, meas-
ure a sample of behavior, and, insofar as culture affects behavior, its influ-
ence will be manifested in the test's results. 153 Accordingly, although not
strictly incorporating the concept of differential validity, the Uniform
Guidelines recognize the concept of "test fairness."' 15 4 Employers must
keep records of a test's effect on minority groups 155 and conduct fairness
studies when technically feasible. 56 The greater the adverse impact on
Racial Differences in Validity of Employment Tests Reality or lllusion? 58 J. APPLIED
PSYCH. 5 (1973); notes 52-56 and accompanying text supra.
150. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text supra. Technical feasibility existed when a
minority group constituted an identifiable factor in the relevant labor market and a sufficient
number were tested to achieve findings of statistical and practical significance. 29 C.F.R. §§
1607.4(b), 1607.5(b)(5) (1977).
151. See note 81 supra.
152. See, e.g., Humphreys, Statistical Denitions of Test Validity/or Minority Groups, 58
J. APPLIED PSYCH. 1 (1973); O'Connor, Wexley & Alexander, Single-Group Validity.- Fact or
Fallacy.P 60 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 352 (1975). Furthermore, an extensive six-year study con-
ducted by the Educational Testing Service and the Civil Service Commission found little
evidence of differential validity and concluded that carefully administered and valid em-
ployment tests are generally equally predictive for all ethnic groups. U.S. CIVIL SERVICE
COMM'N & EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF SOURCES OF BIAS IN
THE PREDICTION OF JOB PERFORMANCE: A Six YEAR STUDY 16 (L.A. Crooks ed. 1972).
153. See ANASTASI, supra note 34, at 343-49.
154. The Uniform Guidelines define test unfairness as follows:
When members of one race, sex, or ethnic group characteristically obtain lower
scores on a selection procedure than members of another group, and the differences
in scores are not reflected in differences in a measure of job performance, use of the
selection procedure may unfairly deny opportunities to members of the group that
obtains the lower scores.
Section 14(B)(8)(a), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,301 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14
(B)(8)(a)). The FEA Guidelines had adopted the same definition. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.12
(b)(7) (1977).
155. Uniform Guidelines, §§ 4(A) to 4(B), 15(A)(1) to 15(A)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,297,
38,303 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.4(A) to 1607.4(B), 1607.15(A)(1) to
1607.15(A)(2)). Accord, FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.4(a) (1977).
156. Uniform Guidelines, § 14(B)(8)(e), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,302 (1978)(to be codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(8)(e)). Accord, FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.12(b) (1977). The
guidelines indicate the need for substantial numbers of applicants from each group in order
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minority groups, the greater the need to investigate for possible unfair-
ness. 157 Although the Uniform Guidelines do not provide employers with
any standards for measuring test fairness, they do require that if "unfair-
ness is found," the employer must either replace the test or modify it so as
to eliminate the bias. 58 Because either of these alternatives poses signifi-
cant costs, the probable practical consequences would be to lower the cut-
off score or to discontinue the use of test scores for ranking purposes.159
D. Determining Adverse Impact
A final consideration involves the kind of showing needed to demon-
strate adverse impact. The EEOC Guidelines required the validation of
any individual test shown to "adversely affect" job opportunities of per-
sons protected by Title VII.160 "Adverse effect," however, was not defined.
The Albemarle Court had ruled it was incumbent on the complaining
party to make a prima facie showing of adverse impact but did not estab-
lish the quantum to be demonstrated before the employer would be re-
quired to validate. 16' Because most tests will adversely affect some
group,162 employers literally could have been required to validate all tests.
Furthermore, the EEOC Guidelines did not specify whether adverse im-
pact was to be measured by a test's comparative pass-fail rates, the ulti-
to achieve statistical significance, effectively exempting small employers. Employers are not
required to hire or promote persons merely to conduct fairness studies. Section
14(B)(8)(e)(i), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,302 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(8)(e)(i)).
The guidelines further note that where the range of scores for any one minority group is
small as compared with those for other groups, misleading evidence of unfairness may re-
sult. Id. § 14(B)(8)(c)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(8)(c)). See 1974 APA
STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 43-44.
157. Uniform Guidelines, § 14(B)(8)(b), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,301 (1978)(to be codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(8)(b)).
158. Id. § 14(B)(8)(d), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,301 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §
1607.14(B)(8)(d)). Accord, FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.12(b)(7)(iv) (1977). Where a
fairness study is indicated, but is technically infeasible, an employer may use any test which
is otherwise valid unless the technical infeasibility is the result of the employer's discrimina-
tory practices. This result must be demonstrated by facts other than past failure to validate
in accordance with the guidelines. Section 14(B)(8)(f), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,302 (1978)(to be
codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14(B)(8)(f)). Accord, FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-
3.12(b)(7)(vi) (1977).
159. See Uniform Guidelines, §§ 5(A) to 5(H), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,298 (1978)(to be codified
in 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.5(A) to 1607.5(H)).
160. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3 (1977).
161. 422 U.S. at 425. See LARSON, supra note 2 at §§ 74.50 to 74.52.
162. See, e.g., ANASTASI, supra note 34, at 345-46; Sayer, Cole & Cole, Utilities and the
Issue of Fairness in a Decision Theoretic Mode/For Selection, 13 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 59
(1976).
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mate hiring rates, or some combination of both. 163
In contrast, the Uniform Guidelines shift the basis for measuring ad-
verse impact to the total selection process - the "bottom line" - of which
a particular test may be but a single component. 164 Employers generally
will be required to validate individual components of their selection proc-
ess only if the "bottom line" indicates adverse impact - that is, when the
hiring rate for minorities is disproportionately lower than the rate for non-
minorities. 65 Where no such overall impact is shown, however, the fed-
eral government's enforcement agencies, "in the usual circumstances," will
not expect an employer to validate each component separately. 66
The Uniform Guidelines adopt a "four-fifths rule" as the primary indi-
cator of the presence or absence of adverse impact. Under this formula, a
selection rate for any minority group falling below eighty percent of that of
the group with the highest selection rate generally will be considered evi-
dence of adverse impact.' 67 The Guidelines note, however, that the four-
fifths rule is to be viewed as a practical rule of thumb, not a legal defini-
tion, and that greater or lesser differences also may evidence adverse im-
163. Cf. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (adverse impact is shown when the test selects appli-
cants for hire in racial pattern significantly different from pool of applicants). See generally
Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Emloyment Discrimination, 1977 U. ILL.
L.F. 69, 76-82.
164. Section 4(C), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,297 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(C)).
Accord, FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.4(b) (1977).
165. Id.
166. Id. The guidelines note, however, two situations in which an employer will be re-
quired to demonstrate job-relatedness regardless of the bottom line. The first situation is
where the selection procedure is a significant factor in perpetuating the effects of past dis-
crimination. 1d. For example, where an employer requires a high school diploma as a pre-
condition for promotion or transfer. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971); Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1976). The second situation is
where the weight of authority has held that a particular selection procedure is not job-re-
lated under certain circumstances. Section 4(C), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,297(to be codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1607.4(C)). See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)(height and weight
requirements for prison guard); Green v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir.
1975), modified, 549 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir. 1977)(lack of arrest record may not be required as a
condition of employment); Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal.
1970), afl'd, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972)(lack of arrest record may be required as a condi-
tion of employment). Moreover, the bottom line concept is not offered as a legal interpreta-
tion of Title VII; rather, it is a rule of prosecutorial and administrative discretion. Uniform
Guidelines, Supplementary Information, Part III, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,291 (1978).
167. Uniform Guidelines, § 4(D), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,297 (1978) (to be codified in 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4(D)). Accord, FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.4(b) (1977). For example, assume
an employer had 120 applicants for a job, 80 white and 40 black. Sixty applicants were
hired, 48 white and 12 black. The selection rate for whites is 48/60, or 60%, while the selec-
tion rate for blacks is 12/40, or 30%. Because whites have the highest rate of 60%, the impact
ratio for blacks is computed as follows: .30/.60 = .50 or 50%. Since the selection rate for
blacks is less than 80% of the white selection rate, adverse impact is indicated.
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pact.' 68 Moreover, in considering whether to initiate compliance efforts,
both the employer's affirmative action programs and its overall equal em-
ployment opportunity posture will be taken into account. 169
The Uniform Guidelines' adoption of the bottom line concept and the
four-fifths rule could increase a plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination. 70 Under the EEOC Guidelines, a plaintiff
usually met its burden of demonstrating adverse impact by introducing
statistical evidence of a significant differential between minority and
nonminority pass-fail rates.' 7 1 Courts generally did not require proof of
disparity in actual hiring rates before requiring the employer to demon-
strate job-relatedness. 172 To present a prima facie case under the "bottom
line" concept plaintiffs now usually must show that the employer's total
selection process, rather than a single test, adversely affects minorities.
Only then will the employer be forced to put forth proof of job-related-
ness. 173 Since adverse impact is defined in terms of disporportionate hir-
ing rates rather than simply test performance, 74 employers hiring a
168. Uniform Guidelines, Supplementary Information, Part II, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,291
(1978). Presumably an employer's location, recruitment practices or reputation would influ-
ence its applicant flow, requiring a departure from the general rule. See generally Newman,
Discrimination in Recruitment. An Empirical Analysis, 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 15
(1978)(while recruitment practices do not differ greatly across geographical regions, they are
moderated by company size; larger companies with government contracts being more prone
to give preference to minorities).
169. Uniform Guidelines § 4(E), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,298 (1978)(to be codified in 29 C.F.R. §
1607.4(E)). Accord, FEA Guidelines, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.5 (1977).
170. An employer is not obligated to demonstrate validity in the absence of adverse im-
pact. Uniform Guidelines, Supplementary Information, Part II, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,291-92
(1978), (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 98 S. Ct. 2943 (1978)).
171. See, e.g., Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1348-49 (8th Cir.), Va-
catedon other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491
F.2d 1364, 1372-73 (5th Cir. 1974). See also Rosenblum, The Use of Labor Statistics and
Analysis in Title VII Cases- Rios, Chicago and Beyond, I INDUS. REL. L.J. 685 (1977).
172. See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1019 (Ist Cir.
1974). See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
1158-96 (1976).
173. See notes 164-66 and accompanying text supra.
174. In Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492, 497-99 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934
(1976), the Sixth Circuit ruled that a plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case with
proof of disproportionate test results where the overall hiring process had no adverse affect
on minorities. Accord, Friend v. Leidinger, [1978] LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) (18 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas.) 1052, 1056 (4th Cir. Nov. 29, 1978). Several other pre-Uniform Guidelines deci-
sions focused on the comparative hiring rates rather than test performance. See, e.g., United
States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 427-28 (7th Cir. 1977); Hester v. Southern Ry. Co.,
497 F.2d 1374, 1379 (5th Cir. 1974). See generally Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Ef-
fects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis under Title VII, 56
TEX. L. REV. 1, 25-36 (1977). See also Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment
Discrimination Law.- Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975).
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sufficient number of applicants from a particular minority group should be
able to use nonvalid tests with relative impunity.
75
Under the four-fifths rule, a determination of adverse impact is highly
dependent upon the employer's minority applicant flow because the im-
pact is computed by comparing each group's selection ratio, 176 rather than
by comparing the test scores of minorities with non-minorities, or their
respective numbers in the employer's workforce. 177 In essence, the agen-
cies adopting the Uniform Guidelines have shifted their attention away
from individual instances of discrimination toward securing group-based
relief from large-scale offenders. 7 8
III. MERITOCRACY V. EQUAL ACHIEVEMENT
In several respects, the Uniform Guidelines undoubtedly will advance
fair employment law. Their most obvious benefit is that federal agencies
with equal employment opportunity enforcement responsibilities finally
will be guided by a uniform, mutually agreed upon set of standards. This
will eliminate dual standards of enforcement and should reduce inter-
agency antagonism. 179 Additionally, since the Uniform Guidelines largely
conform to rulemaking procedures outlined in the Administrative Proce-
175. Cf EEOC v. Navajo Refining Co., 47 U.S.L.W. 2598 (10th Cir., March 13, 1979)
(although educational requirements and appitude tests eliminate from pool of applicants a
greater number of Spanish surnamed Americans (SSA's) than Anglos, employer not re-
quired to validate selection procedures because the percentage of SSA's actually hired ex-
ceeded both the percentage of SSA's who applied and the percentage of SSA's in the
relevant labor market). It has been argued, however, that where test performance is the sole
or primary factor in an employment decision the bottom line concept will have little effect.
Moreover, given the Uniform Guidelines' extensive data reporting requirements, §§ 4(A) to
4(B), 4(D), 15(A) to 15(H), 43 Fed. Reg. 38,297-98, 38,303-307 (1978)(to be codified in 29
C.F.R. §§ 1607.4(A) to 1607.4(B), 1607.4(D), 1607.15(A) to 1607.15(H)), statistical data pre-
viously unavailable to most plaintiffs will now be readily accessible through discovery. In-
terview with David Rose, Esq., Department of Justice, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 30, 1979).
176. See note 167 supra. See also Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment
Testing.- Statistical Proof under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793, 805-11 (1978) (four-fifths
rule ill-conceived because it fails to account for differences in sample size and magnitude of
differences in pass-fail rates).
177. Cf Van Bowen & Riggens, A Technical Look at the Eighty Percent Rule as Applied to
Employee Selection Procedures, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 647, 650-53 (1978)(four-fifths rule not
statistically valid because it does not apply consistently to all employers: more stringent for
those who make fewer selections and harsher on those who select from labor pools contain-
ing a higher proportion of minorities). See also Hay, Making Statistics Work/or the Em-
ployer in Employment Discrimination Cases, 3 EMP. REL. L.J. 374, 378-79 (1978)(defendant's
ability to focus court's attention on recent hiring rate rather than current workforce compo-
sition will decrease the number of cases in which plaintiffs can establish prima facie case).
178. Statements made on behalf of the EEOC support this proposition. See London, A
Conversation with Eleanor Holmes Norton, 3 EMP. REL. L.J. 314, 317-20 (1978).
179. See notes 28-29 and accompanying text supra.
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dure Act 180 and represent a synthesis of agency judgments based on years
of expert work, they likely will receive even greater judicial deference than
those guidelines promulgated by the EEOC. 18 1 In any event, the Uniform
Guidelines should be applied more consistently by the courts. From the
employers' perspective, the Uniform Guidelines present more reasonable
standards than those of the EEOC and, arguably, they will inspire the fu-
ture development and use of a greater number of standardized selection
procedures. 182
Nonetheless, by emphasizing standards for test validity and largely ig-
noring test fairness, the Uniform Guidelines do little to ameliorate the un-
derlying tension between traditional merit principles and an equal
achievement philosophy.183 EEOC's retreat from its earlier position of re-
quiring differential validity studies is understandable. The concept simply
had not achieved sufficient recognition in professional circles to warrant its
180. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). In contrast to the EEOC Guidelines which were never sub-
mitted for public comment, see Seelman, supra note 23, at 4, and were still accorded "great
deference" by courts in Title VII cases, see notes 59-85 and accompanying text supra, the
adoption of the Uniform Guidelines was preceded by public notice, receipt of written com-
ments, and a public meeting at which testimony was taken from representatives of private
industry, state and local governments, labor organizations, civil rights groups and profes-
sional psychologists. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,542 (1977); No-
tice of Issues of Particular Interest for Public Hearing and Meeting, 43 Fed. Reg. 11,812
(1978); Uniform Guidelines, Supplementary Information, Part VIII, 43 Fed. Reg. 38,292-93
(1978).
181. Factors underlying both the substance and the promulugation of the Uniform
Guidelines suggest that prior Supreme Court hesitations about according great weight to
interpretive agency guidelines have been adequately allayed. First, the fact of public notice
and comment, see note 180 supra, should alleviate doubts expressed by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Blackmun in their 41bemarle opinions. See 422 U.S. at 449 (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in the judgment); id. at 452 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Second, although the Davis majority ignored the EEOC's Guidelines pertaining to job-relat-
edness, the Court did note that a higher degree of judicial scrutiny would be appropriate
under Title VII. See 426 U.S. at 247. Third, the Uniform Guidelines are not subject to the
same flaws as EEOC's pregnancy guidelines. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert 429 U.S. 125
(1976). Under the test of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), adopted in Gilbert,
429 U.S. at 141-42, the Uniform Guidelines are a model of thoroughness and are generally
consistent with both prior agency requirements for test validation and the views enunciated
in Griggs and Albemarle. Moreover, in Gilbert, the EEOC's interpretation was in conflict
with that of the Wage and Hour Administrator of the Department of Labor. In contrast, the
Uniform Guidelines have been agreed upon by all federal agencies with major equal em-
ployment responsibilities. Finally, unlike the citizenship discrimination guidelines at issue
in Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973), the Uniform Guidelines do not add a
new category of discrimination to Title VII.
182. A 1975 study conducted by Prentice-Hall indicated that companies were lessening
their reliance on standardized tests because of actual or anticipated problems with the
EEOC Guidelines. See LARSON, supra note 2, at § 75.22.
183. See note 31 supra.
1979]
Catholic University Law Review
inclusion. 84 The failure to insist on a meaningful demonstration of test
fairness, however, illustrates that the federal government presently is un-
willing to subordinate meritocratic principles in order to achieve remedial
goals.
Validation of selection procedures in accordance with the Uniform
Guidelines cannot ensure equality in employment opportunity for most
members of minority groups. Employment tests measure applicants for
jobs designed by mainstream groups and therefore reflect the culture in
which they were developed. 85 As such, they tend to favor those individu-
als from the the culture in which they were developed. 186 Test questions
may require the possession or use of certain skills or knowledge common
to mainstream groups but not to minorities due to lack of educational or
prior employment experience. 187 Because the testing situation itself may
be a rarity for minorities, it may be inherently unsettling. Such a reality
favors mainstream groups which have been subjected to batteries of stan-
dardized and competitive tests throughout their lives.' 88 In essence, the
Uniform Guidelines do not squarely address the issue of whether validity
studies can enlighten anyone about the actual fairness or unfairness of a
cross-cultural test.' 89 The question remains whether merit-based systems
of employee selection are so inherently biased against those groups which
have been the victims of educational and cultural deprivations as to make
184. See note 152 and accompanying text supra.
185. See CRONBACH, supra note 19, at 247.
186. See ANASTASI, supra note 34, at 345. Cultural differences become cultural handi-
caps when an individual attempts to perform within another culture. Id. at 346. Moreover,
an individual's group membership affects his style of conduct in a given situation. See L.
CRONBACH, EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 320-26 (3d ed. 1977).
187. See Wilson, supra note 37, at 871-72. Many employment tests measure abilities
generally learned in school. Due to overcrowding and low-level funding, minorities who
have attended inner city schools are at a significant educational disadvantage. See North-
cross, The Limits on Employment Testing, 50 J. URBAN LAW 349, 352-53 (1973) and sources
cited therein. Moreover, employment tests are indicators of such cumulative enviromental
effects. See, e.g., A. ANASTASI, COMMON FALLACIES ABOUT HEREDITY, ENVIRONMENT &
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 9 (AMERICAN COLLEGE TESTING PROGRAM RESEARCH REPORT No. 58
(1973)).
188. See generally 1974 APA STANDARDS, supra note 2, at 43-44; ANASTASI, supra note
34, at 58-59.
189. See Peterson & Novick, An Evaluation of Some Models for Culture-Fair Selection,
13 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 3, 28 (1976)(the ideas of culture-fairness and group parity have
spawned incoherent theoretical models that can sanction the very discrimination they seek
to remedy); Darlington, .4 Defense of 'Rational" Personnel Selection, and Two New Models,
13 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT 43, 44 (1976)(rational approach holds that employers should use
culture as part of their selection criteria: a purposeful decision to hire a certain number of
minorities).
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any perceived gains through the use of truly "valid" tests illusory. 190 The
dilemma has been concisely phrased by Professor Derrick Bell:
[11f the country was really committed to eradicate the social and
economic burdens born by the victims of employment discrimi-
nation, it would have fashioned a far more efficacious means of
accomplishing this result. . . [r]eliance on. . . complex and
uncertain [administrative and judicial] process[es] will [not] close
the wide gap in income standards and unemployment
rates .... 191
The Uniform Guidelines apparently support this proposition, that fair
employment laws are but a "limited corrective strategy and the major soci-
etal interest in efficiency is the major limitation."' 192 Their adoption, cou-
pled with EEOC's acquiescence in them, suggests that the present statutory
framework has been stretched to its limit.193 Consistent with this sugges-
tion are indications by the Supreme Court that it will not feel bound to
uphold agency interpretations of Title VII that enlarge the scope of the
Act. 194 Without a clear mandate from Congress, both the federal agencies
and the courts will be unwilling to advance the cause of equal employment
opportunity much further.
IV. CONCLUSION
The articulated goal of standardized testing is to enable employers to
make hiring decisions on the basis of merit, thereby reducing reliance on
subjective criteria unrelated to job qualifications. Unfortunately, merit-
based employment tests, although phrased in racially neutral terms, effec-
tively exclude a disproportionate number of minorities from employment
opportunities. Under Title VII's mandate, various federal agencies at-
tempted to eliminate this adverse racial effect by adopting testing guide-
190. See generaly Thorndike, Concepts of Culture Fairness, 8 J. EDUC. MEASUREMENT
63 (1971); W. BYHAM & M. SPITZER, THE LAW AND PERSONNEL TESTING 128-46 (1971).
191. Bell, Forward- Equal Employment Law and the Continuing Needfor Self-Help, 8
Loy. CHI. L.J. 681 (1977).
192. Fiss, supra note 31, at 303. See also Note, Business Necessity under Title VII of the
Civil Rights 4ct of 1964. A No-41ternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 104-05 (1974).
193. Compare Comment, supra note 6, at 116 (Congress attempted to aid minorities
within the constraints of color blindness and noninterference with legitimate business con-
cerns) with Blumrosen, supra note 7, at 99 (Congress did not actually consider the legal
difinition of discrimination, leaving it to the discretion of the courts).
194. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (EEOC guidelines on sex
discrimination not followed when inconsistent with earlier agency pronouncement and un-
supported by legislative history); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973) (EEOC's
finding of discrimination based on citizenship outside statutory prohibition of discrimina-
tion because of national origin).
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lines that required employers to demonstrate a test's job-relatedness
through validity studies. The multiplicity of different sets of guidelines,
however, precluded the establishment of a uniform national testing policy.
A synthesis of agency viewpoints culminated in the promulgation of the
Uniform Guidelines which provide more precise test validation procedures
than any of the earlier sets. The Uniform Guidelines are significant be-
cause they recognize content and construct studies as appropriate method-
ologies, require employers to justify their use of test scores for ranking and
cutoff purposes, and demand that alternatives with less racial impact be
investigated as a part of any validation effort.
Test validity, however, yet may become a secondary concern in the
quest for equal opportunity in employment. Rooted in the Griggs doctrine
of job-relatedness, validity is essentially a meritocratic principle. While a
valid test does distinguish among individual performance levels on a se-
lected set of items, it also assumes that all applicants have a similar experi-
ential base. In essence, investigations of validity do not reveal whether the
use of a test is fair for those groups who have not had an "equal exposure"
to mainstream culture. By formulating refined standards for test validity
but largely ignoring the issue of test fairness, the Uniform Guidelines fall
short of adequately alleviating the tension between meritocracy and an
equal achievement philosophy.
Ronald B. Rubin
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